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"THE TREATY DOESN'T SAY WE CAN'T
KIDNAP ANYONE"-GOVERNMENT
SPONSORED KIDNAPPING AS A MEANS
OF CIRCUMVENTING EXTRADITION
TREATIES
The United States often secures individuals for prosecution from
other countries through extradition treaty procedures., Extradition
generally occurs when one government requests another to surrender
an individual accused or convicted of an offense that occurred within
the requesting government's territorial jurisdiction.2 Other principles
justify extraditing someone for an alleged crime committed outside of
the requesting government's jurisdiction or territory.'
1. The United States is party to approximately 104 extradition treaties and multilat-
eral extradition arrangements that target specific offenses. See generally EXTRADITION
LAWS AND TREATIES (I.I. Kavass & A. Sprudzs, comp., 1979 & Supp. 1989) [hereinaf-
ter EXTRADITION TREATIES] (setting out the text of all extradition agreements to which
the United States is a party).
2. See U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2 (providing that states can extradite individuals
charged with treason, a felony, or any other crime); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-95 (1988 &
Supp. III 1991) (setting out federal law regarding state and international extradition).
Extradition treaties often provide for the return of fugitives accused of committing a
crime within the territorial jurisdiction of another government. See Christopher L.
Blakesley, A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and Jurisdiction Over Extraterrito-
rial Crimes, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 685, 688 (finding that territorial principles are the
primary basis of jurisdiction in the United States). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 475 cmt. d (1987) [hereinaf-
ter RESTATEMENT] (stating that requesting nations can most easily satisfy judicial juris-
diction requirements when the fugitive commits the alleged crime in the requesting
nation).
3. See Blakesley, supra note 2, at 701-02, 706-07, 713-19 (setting out various theo-
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Most countries maintain that there is no duty to extradite absent a
treaty or statute.4 When a country extradites an individual in the ab-
sence of a treaty, it does so based strictly upon principles of reciprocity
and comity.5 International law does not generally address extradition
issues.6 Moreover, under United States practice, one country can only
demand that the United States deliver an alleged fugitive to the de-
manding country if both nations are party to an extradition treaty.7
ries behind so-called "extraterritorial" jurisdiction for extradition). Harvard interna-
tional law researchers identified and delineated five types of extraterritorial jurisdiction
policies in 1935. See Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction With Respect
to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research]. These
principles are: (1) territorial jurisdiction, which depends on the place where the individ-
ual committed the offense; (2) protective jurisdiction, which depends on whether the
requesting country's national interest is injured; (3) national jurisdiction, which depends
on the nationality of the offender; (4) universal jurisdiction, which depends on whether
the offense is especially heinous and injurious to humanity and gives jurisdiction to any
forum that has custody of the offender; and (5) passive personality jurisdiction, which
depends on the nationality of the victim. Id. 480-592. See also Blakesley, supra note 2,
at 687-719 (discussing each of these principles in detail). Experts continue to use these
designations, although some choose to alter or merge some of the designations. Id. at
687 n.7.
4. See generally I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 23-34
(1971) (discussing the evolution of countries' legal duty to extradite); Andrew B.
Campbell, Note, The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine: A Jurisdictional Weapon in the War on
Drugs, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 385, 399-400 (1990) (noting the competing views
regarding extradition). Most nations believe either that nations have an inherent legal
duty to comply with extradition requests or that state sovereignty, absent other obliga-
tions, dictates that nations need not extradite individuals to another country. Id. at
399. The United States adheres to the latter view. Id. at 400.
5. See SHEARER, supra note 4, at 25-27. This view extends to both common and
civil law countries. Id. at 25. To date, only a few South American countries have found
a legal duty to extradite in the absence of a treaty. Id. at 26. Nonetheless, most govern-
ments consider cooperation in extradition proceedings no more than a polite gesture
of mutual regard. See 1 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION:
UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 319 (2d rev. ed. 1987).
6. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 475 cmt. a (noting that international law
does not customarily require extradition). See also I BASsIOUNI, supra note 5, at 319.
("States are.., under no clear international obligation or duty to surrender a fugitive
from justice...."). For the most part, international law only creates duties to extradite
for certain international crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity. Id. at
320.
7. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1886). See also Holmes v.
Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569 (1840) (espousing for the first time the rule that the
United States had no obligation to extradite unless it was party to a treaty with the
requesting country).
Recent legislation alters this policy. In 1990, Congress enacted a law which permits
the Secretary of State to surrender a United States citizen to a foreign country request-
ing extradition, even though the relevant treaty or convention does not obligate the
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In the United States, treaties are the supreme law of the land.' Ex-
tradition treaties are self-executing and are as binding as legislation.9
One does not need statutory authority to arrest a fugitive if he or she
meets the terms of the appropriate treaty. 0 In addition, many consti-
tutional restrictions, such as the due process clauses," do not apply to
international extraditions regulated by treaty. 2 Moreover, many com-
mentators maintain that the countries do not have to follow specific
treaty procedures when the countries impliedly agree to informal deliv-
ery of fugitives. 3
The recently decided case, United States v. Alvarez-Machain,14 how-
United States to do so if the requesting country is complying with other treaty or con-
vention requirements. See International Narcotics Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-623, § 11, 104 Stat. 3350, 3356 (1990) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3196 (Supp. III
1991)).
8. U.S. CONST., art. VI, el. 2.
9. In re Metzger, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 176, 188-89 (1847). United States extradition
procedures vary and depend on the governing treaty. See generally EXTRADITION
TREATIES, supra note 1 (compiling extradition treaties to which the United States is a
party).
10. Metzger, 46 U.S. at 188.
11. See U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
12. The "social compact" theory rests on basic principles of contract and considers
the Constitution to be binding on the government and "the people" by mutual obliga-
tion. See generally United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (find-
ing that the term "the people" "refers to a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to
be considered part of that community"). The phrase "the people" generally implies
protection for citizens of the United States or individuals who have developed ties to the
United States, and not to aliens outside United States territory. For example, Verdugo-
Urquidez held that Fourth Amendment protections for "the people" against unlawful
search and seizure do not apply to government actions against aliens outside the United
States territory. Id. at 265. Moreover, the Fifth Amendment, which applies to "per-
sons," does not give rights to extraterritorial aliens. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763, 785 (1950); United States v. Kraiselburd, 786 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 990 (1986).
As a result of the foregoing, the United States may enter a treaty which applies to
crimes already committed. See, e.g., Markham v. Pitchess, 605 F.2d 436, 437-38 (9th
Cir. 1979), cerL denied, 447 U.S. 904 (1980). Generally, as long as a treaty is in effect,
the United States can demand extradition. Id. It is immaterial that the crime occurred
before the extradition treaty became effective. Id.
13. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 432 & cmt. (explaining that a state may
prosecute if the state from which the individual was abducted does not protest); 1 BAS-
SIOUNI, supra note 5, at 630 (noting that where parties to a treaty fail to abide by the
treaty procedures and still extradite an individual, that person does not have standing to
object because he was not a party to the treaty).
14. 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
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ever, calls into question the effectiveness of extradition treaties. In Al-
varez-Machain, the Supreme Court determined that the United States
government could seize a foreign national from Mexico without follow-
ing the procedures outlined in the United States-Mexico extradition
treaty. 
15
This Recent Development discusses the past, present and future of
United States extradition treaties in light of the Alvarez-Machain deci-
sion. Part I traces the history of jurisdictional issues that have arisen
in the context of extradition treaties. 6 In addition, Part I notes the
limited role international law plays in determining a court's jurisdic-
tion over individuals. 7 Part II analyzes the recent Supreme Court de-
cision in Alvarez-Machain, which minimizes the role of an extradition
treaty when the United States chooses to circumvent the treaty's extra-
dition procedures."8 Finally, Part III discusses how this decision im-
pacts present and future conduct of the United States and other
countries in the area of extradition and calls on United States officials
to maintain the integrity of the extradition treaties to which they
agreed. 1
9
I. ExTRADITION TREATIES' LIMITING EFFECT ON COURTS'
JURISDICTION
Prior to Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court never addressed the
specific issue of whether the United States government could forcibly
abduct an individual in alleged violation of extradition treaty require-
ments.2° In 1886, however, the Court established the doctrine of spe-
cialty which holds that when a person is brought before a court
15. Id. at 2193-94.
16. See infra notes 20-37 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 44-75 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 76-104 and accompanying text.
20. See Alvarez-Machaln, 112 S. Ct. at 2191 (noting that the issue before Court was
one of first impression). During the Prohibition, however, the Court twice addressed
issues arising from the seizure of illegal liquor which parties allegedly possessed in viola-
tion of a treaty between the United States and Great Britain. See Cook v. United States,
288 U.S. 102 (1933); Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927). The treaty permitted
British passenger ships to carry liquor in United States waters on the condition that the
ships remain one hour away from United States shores. See Convention for Prevention
of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors, Jan. 23, 1924, U.S. - Gr. Brit., art. II, § 3, 43 Stat.
1761, 1762. In Cook, the Court held that a United States seizure that violated the treaty
precluded any convictions based on the seizure because the seizure provisions of the
treaty were exclusive. 288 U.S. at 121. In Ford, the Court found the seizure valid
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pursuant to an extradition treaty, he or she may only be tried for the
crime which led to extradition.21
That same year the Court determined that extradition treaties do not
negate federal or state courts jurisdiction over people kidnapped and
brought back to the United States by private individuals.22 In Ker v.
Illinois,23 the U.S. Secretary of State2' dispatched a Pinkerton agent to
Peru with the necessary papers requesting that the Peruvian govern-
ment extradite Ker" pursuant to an extradition treaty between Peru
and the United States.26 The agent never presented the papers to Peru-
vian authorities.27 Instead, the agent independently chose to forcibly
kidnap Ker and bring him back to the United States. 28
The Court dismissed Ker's argument that the United States could
only retrieve him pursuant to the United States-Peru extradition
treaty.29 The Court determined that the United States did not call the
treaty into operation30 because the government was not involved in the
because the defendants failed to raise the issue of invalidity at the proper stage of the
proceedings. 273 U.S. at 606.
21. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 430 (1886). See also United States v.
Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 607 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
22. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 443 (1886). Some commentators argue that Ker
stands for the broader proposition that a forcible abduction, whether sponsored by fed-
eral or state government, never negates a court's jurisdiction over an individual. See,
e.g., Mitchell J. Matorin, Note, Unchaining the Law: The Legality of Extraterritorial
Abduction in Lieu of Extradition, 41 DUKE L.J. 907, 909-12 (1992) (stating that Ker
"established that the means by which a person comes within the jurisdiction of the court
has no effect on the court's power to try him").
23. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
24. The governor of Illinois petitioned the United States Secretary of State to seek
Ker's extradition from Peru. Id at 438.
25. Ker fled to Peru after an Illinois state court tried and convicted him of larceny.
Id. at 437.
26. Id. at 439. To review the treaty discussed in Ker, see Treaty on Extradition, Jul.
27, 1874, U.S.-Peru, 18 Stat. 719.
27. The opinion does not explain why the agent did not apprehend Ker according to
treaty procedures. Commentators theorize that the agent kidnapped Ker because there
were not any designated authorities in Peru to which the agent could present the extra-
dition papers because of the recent revolution in Peru. See, eg., John G. Kester, Some
Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEo. L.J. 1441, 1451 (1988) (noting that
Ker is distinguishable from an ordinary extradition case because the agent seized Ker
following a Peruvian revolution which left the courts and civil government in a state of
disfunction).
28. Ker, 119 U.S. at 438.
29. Id. at 442-43.
30. Id. at 443.
1993]
Washington University Open Scholarship
270 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 44:265
decision to kidnap Ker.3 1 Because the agent did not rely on the treaty
to make the arrest, Ker could not stand on the argument that he was
improperly brought before United States authorities pursuant to the
treaty requirements.32 In such a case, the Court found the extradition
treaty inapplicable, and a court therefore could try the individual for
whatever crimes the prosecutor brings against the defendant.
33
Decades later, the Court expressly reaffirmed the Ker doctrine in
Frisbie v. Collins,34 a case involving interstate extradition. In Frisbie,
Michigan officers forcibly abducted Collins in Chicago and took him to
Michigan where he was tried and convicted of murder.35 Pursuant to a
writ of habeas corpus, the Court held that a forcible abduction and
transfer from one state to another does not violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 36 The Court reiterated the rule
that the manner in which the individual is brought before the court
does not negate the court's jurisdiction.37
Customary international law is similar to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine in
that it seldom serves as a means for denying courts jurisdiction when
individuals are extradited by means not specified in a treaty.38  Pres-
31. The Court noted that the kidnapping occurred without any pretense of author-
ity pursuant to the extradition treaty or from the United States government. Id
32. Id The Court also rejected Ker's argument that the manner of his extradition
violated due process. Id The Court stated that irregularities in the manner in which
authorities bring someone into custody do not entitle that person to escape trial as long
as that person is indicted properly. Id. The Court's holding on this issue is consistent
with the prevailing practice of refusing to apply the Fourth Amendment in pretrial
situations. See, eg., Jonathan Gentin, Comment, Government-Sponsored Abduction of
Foreign Criminals Abroad: Reflections on United States v. Caro-Quintero and the Inad-
equacy of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, 40 EMORY L.J. 1227, 1231 (1991).
33. Ker, 119 U.S. at 443.
34. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
35. Id at 520.
36. Id. at 522. Collins also argued that the officers violated the Federal Kidnapping
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1948). Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 520. The Court determined that the
officers probably did violate the Federal Kidnapping Act, but decided that Congress did
not intend to prohibit states from prosecuting individuals who were brought before their
courts improperly. Id at 522-23. The Court reasoned that immunity from state prose-
cution was not a remedy under the Act. Id.
37. The Ker-Frisbie doctrine is the American equivalent of the Roman maxim
"male captus, bene detentus," which provides that jurisdiction survives despite illegal
apprehension. See 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at 201, 213.
38. See Michael R. Pontoni, Comment, Authority of the United States to Extraterri-
torially Apprehend and Lawfully Prosecute International Drug Traffickers and Other
Fugitives, 21 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 215, 234 (1990) ("There is a widely held conviction or
"custom" among nations that no state shall prosecute or punish any person who has
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ently, many international conventions 39 contain duties to extradite or
prosecute for international crimes.4° The duty to extradite, however, is
not clear when the crime is a non-international crime because most
nations require treaties or national legislation, or both.41 Yet, others
believe that when one country impinges on another country's sover-
eignty, the intruding country is violating customary international
law.42 While United States courts try to avoid violating customary in-
ternational law as much as possible, federal sovereignty outweighs the
general body of international law when enforcing law within the terri-
tory of the United States.
43
II. UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN
In United States v. Alvarez-Machain," the Supreme Court held that
federal courts had jurisdiction to try a Mexican national forcibly kid-
napped from Mexico and brought to the United States on behalf of the
federal government.4 5 The Court held that although the United States
did not follow the treaty procedures as defined in the United States-
Mexico extradition document, officials did not have to repatriate the
foreign national to Mexico, but could try him before a United States
been brought within its territory by measures in violation of international law without
first obtaining the consent of the state whose rights have been violated.").
39. An international convention is an agreement between nations or states which is
similar to, but usually less formal or binding than, a treaty. BLACK's LAW DICTION-
ARY 331 (6th ed. 1990). See 1 BAsSIoUNI, supra note 5, at 13-22 for an extensive list of
international conventions that contain duties to extradite under international criminal
law.
40. International crimes include war, genocide, apartheid, torture, slavery, piracy,
aircraft hijacking, terrorism, drug trafficking, and bribery. See I BASSIOUNI, supra note
5, at 13-22 for a list of conventions regarding these and other crimes.
41. Id. at 23.
42. Customary international law is the result of general and consistent practices
that nations follow due to a sense of legal obligation. REsTATEMENT, supra note 2,
§ 102(2).
43. See, e.g., Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1427 (C.D. Cal. 1985)
("While international law may provide the substantive rule of law in a given situation,
the enforcement of international law is left to individual states."). The Nuremburg tri-
bunal noted that international law accommodates principles of national sovereignty.
Id. at 1427. Even though international law is universal, states need not enforce it, espe-
cially when it conflicts with a state's procedural legal rules. Id Further, if the United
States enforced all international laws without exception, its sovereignty would be sub-
sumed by international law. See Pontoni, supra note 38, at 235.
44. 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
45. Id at 2190.
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court.4 6
The Alvarez-Machain abduction was the result of an extensive five
year investigation by the federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).4 7
The DEA intended to expose and convict associates of a Guadalajara
drug cartel responsible for torturing and murdering DEA Special
Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar. 48 The DEA believed that Alvarez-
Machain, a medical doctor, abetted Camarena's murder by extending
Camarena's life during his interrogation and torture.4 9 The DEA insti-
gated Alvarez-Machain's kidnapping from his medical office in Guada-
lajara, Mexico,5" whereupon the Mexican government officially
protested the kidnapping.51
Although DEA agents did not personally kidnap Alvarez-
Machain,52 the district court concluded that the government was re-
sponsible.5" The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's conclu-
sion.54 Although the Supreme Court's majority avoided an express
factual affirmation of the government's involvement in this kidnapping
because of its technical holding, the Court implied as much when com-
46. Id at 2194.
47. Abraham Abramovsky, Extraterritorial Abductions: America's "Catch and
Snatch" Policy Run Amok, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 151, 161 (1991).
48. Id at 160-61. In retaliation for a major raid instigated by Camarena, the cartel
abducted Camarena from Guadalajara and interrogated, tortured, and murdered him.
Id See also Richard J. Meislin, U.S. Agent's Body Firmly Identified, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
8, 1985, at A3 (describing the details of Camarena's death); Trial Opens in Death of
Tortured Drug Agent, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1988, § 1, at 25 (reporting on the first day
of the trial of Camarena's alleged murderers).
49. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2190. Dr. Alvarez-Machain provided medical
services to members and associates of the drug cartel. See Abramovsky, supra note 47,
at 166 n.71 (recounting this fact from informant's statement).
50. For an extensive discussion regarding the elusive facts surrounding the Alvarez-
Machain kidnapping, see Abramovsky, supra note 47, at 165-70.
51. 112 S. Ct. at 2196. Others accused of Camarena's murder were also extradited
from various countries, none in compliance with extradition treaties. However, the
other countries were more cooperative; and, unlike Mexico, none of the other countries
protested. See generally Abramovsky, supra note 47, at 161-65 for a discussion of the
other extradition actions, indictments, and trials relating to the Camarena murder.
52. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 603 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd
sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 5.
Ct. 2188 (1992). Through Mexican contacts, DEA officials offered a reward and ex-
penses in return for Alvarez-Machain. Id
53. Id at 609.
54. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466, 1467 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd,
112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
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paring the present case to established precedent.55
The Court refused to invalidate the United States' jurisdiction over
Alvarez-Machan.56 Despite the United States government's participa-
tion in the abduction of a foreign national from his own country,57 the
existence of an extradition treaty between the United States and Mex-
ico,5" and Mexico's protest regarding the kidnapping,59 the Court held
that the treaty did not expressly prohibit government sponsored
kidnappings that occurred without the approval of the "asylum" coun-
try.6' As a result, the treaty did not apply, and the Court could imple-
ment the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.61  Therefore, the government's
circumvention of the extradition treaty was immaterial in determining
whether a federal court has jurisdiction.62
In determining that the United States-Mexico extradition require-
ments did not apply to the United States in the Alvarez-Machain situa-
tion, the Court reviewed the terms of the treaty, 63 its historical
context,6 and the impact of international law on the treaty's scope.65
The United States and Mexico outlined their extradition policies with
55. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193. The dissent clearly stated that the
kidnapping was nothing more than one country abducting the citizen of another coun-
try. Id. at 2197 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. Id at 2197.
57. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the circum-
stances surrounding Alvarez-Machain's kidnapping.
58. See infra note 67 for the full text of the relevant provisions of the United States-
Mexico extradition treaty.
59. The Court of Appeals deemed the official protest from Mexico essential to verify
that the "offended" nation actually objected to the abduction and did not tacitly consent
to the abduction as "informal." 112 S. Ct. at 2195. The Supreme Court held that
Mexico's objection to the kidnapping was immaterial to the determination of whether a
United States court must enforce extradition treaty procedures that the United States
government never invoked. Id. The Court also found that it would have to enforce the
extradition treaty on behalf of the abducted individual, regardless of whether the other
nation objected to the kidnapping, if the treaty applied with the force of law. Id.
60. Id at 2197.
61. Id. at 2193.
62. See id. at 2199 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court's decision effec-
tively sanctioned kidnapping as an optional method for obtaining jurisdiction over ac-
cused offenders).
63. See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
65. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
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one another in a 1978 treaty.66 In particular, Article 9 of the treaty
states that each country's executive shall determine whether or not to
extradite its own nationals to the requesting party.6 7 If the executive
refuses to extradite the individual, he shall submit the case to the au-
thorities in his own country.
68
Respondent Alvarez-Machain argued that because the United States
did not invoke the treaty and allow the Mexican authorities to decide
whether or not to extradite him to the United States, federal courts did
not have jurisdiction over him.69 Respondent argued that if the United
States simply chooses to forego the treaty rules, the treaty is meaning-
less.70 The Court agreed with the government and determined that
extradition treaties only exist to define mutual obligations to deliver
individuals in certain circumstances.71 In effect, if the United States
does not use the diplomatic channels set out in the treaty for extradi-
tion purposes, the treaty restrictions do not apply.72
The Court bolstered its decision by stating that Mexico was aware of
the United States' practice of abducting individuals.73 Thus, if Mexico
wanted to stop the United States from abducting individuals without
66. Treaty on Extradition, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059 [hereinafter
U.S.-Mex. Treaty].
67. Specifically, Article 9 of the Treaty provides that:
1. - Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up its own nationals,
but the executive authority of the requested Party shall, if not prevented by the
laws of that Party, have the power to deliver them up if, in its discretion, it be
deemed proper to do so.
2. - If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the
requested Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose
of prosecution, provided that Party has jurisdiction over the offense.
Id. at 5065.
68. Id.
69. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 U.S. at 2193-94.
70. Id. at 2194.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 2194-96.
73. The Court referred to a congressional reprint of a 1906 correspondence between
Robert Bacon, then the U.S. Secretary of State, and Balbino Davalos, a Mexican Charg6
d'Affaires, regarding the 1905 abduction of Antonio Martinez, a Mexican national. See
PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc.
No. 1, 59th Cong., 2d Sess., 870, 1121-22 (1906). Mexico protested Martinez's abduc-
tion and the United States' disregard of the then-current extradition procedures. Id.
The Secretary of State responded that, in light of Ker, the extradition was proper and
Martinez's trial in the United States would proceed. Id. See supra notes 22-33 and
accompanying text for a thorough discussion of the Ker decision.
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treaty sanction, it would have specifically addressed the issue in the
1978 Treaty.74 Finally, the Court determined that the extradition
treaty's purpose was too specific to embody both the broad condemna-
tion of international abduction and the broad principle of international
law that one government should not exercise its police powers in an-
other's territory.7"
III. EVALUATION
Application of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine when the federal government
abducts a national from a party to an extradition treaty with the
United States can set a dangerous precedent. Many of the extradition
agreements to which the United States is a party give the contracting
parties an option as to whether to extradite their own nationals.7 6 In-
deed, the Mexican government predicts that the decision in favor of the
United States government in the Alvarez-Machain case will encourage
other illegal abductions.77 Canada emphasized its concern that the de-
cision will encourage American states to kidnap wanted individuals
74. 112 S. Ct. at 2194. The Court referred to jurisdictional language proposed by a
1935 Harvard-sponsored research group. See Harvard Research, supra note 3, at 442
(suggesting that states could not prosecute foreign nationals for violations of interna-
tional criminal law without the consent of the interested government).
Justice Stevens strongly disagreed with the majority and asserted that the Court's
reliance on the fact that the treaty did not expressly forbid kidnapping implied a con-
struction that the parties secretly reserved the right to self-help whenever they so
choose. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2199 (Stevens, J., dissenting). To make his
point, Justice Stevens noted that the Court's decision effectively added a new clause to
Article 9 of the United States-Mexico extradition treaty which reads: "Notwithstand-
ing paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, either Contracting Party can, without the con-
sent of the other, abduct nationals from the territory of one Party to be tried in the
territory of the other." 1d. n. 11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194-96. According to the Court, the extradi-
tion treaty between the United States and Mexico is simply too narrow in scope to infer
an overall prohibition against the United States entering Mexico. Id. Furthermore, the
treaty does not define instances when such a prohibition is appropriate. Id. The Court
noted that there are many occasions, such as wartime, when one country "invades"
another country but the invasion would not violate the terms of an extradition treaty.
Id. at 2196. But see id. at 2199 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority
stands on a "highly improbable" interpretation of the treaty; the more plausible inter-
pretation prohibits each country from ignoring the territorial integrity of the other in
extradition cases, not all situations).
76. See, eg., Treaty on Extradition, Mar. 3, 1978, U.S.-Japan, art. 5, 31 U.S.T. 892,
897 (stating that the requested party is not required to extradite its own nationals);
Treaty on Extradition, June 9, 1977, U.S.-Nor., art. 4, § 1, 31 U.S.T. 5619, 5624 (stating
that the executive of each country has discretion to give up its own nationals).
77. See Laurie Becklund, Mexico Takes Protest of Kidnapping to U.S. Court, L.A.
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from other countries.78 Local officials' actions may be even more dan-
gerous simply because of the untold number of local police depart-
ments that may decide to follow suit without any federal control over
the situations.79
In addition to the possible growth of United States sponsored
kidnappings, other countries may look to Alvarez-Machain if they an-
ticipate difficulties in extraditing United States citizens.80 Just as the
United States did not allow the Mexican government to apply its own
laws in lieu of United States laws to Dr. Alvarez-Machain, 8' a Mexican
national, other countries may follow suit and do the same.82 Foreign
countries may kidnap and judge United States citizens in their country
without an initial United States review to determine whether the indi-
vidual should be extradited or tried by a United States court.83
Yet, some commentators contend that Alvarez-Machain's holding is
appropriate in light of the ongoing drug problem in the United
TIMES, Nov. 14, 1990, at B3 (citing a formal letter to the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals from the Mexican Consul General).
78. See Marcia Coyle & Marianne Lavelle, Kidnapping Okay, NAT'L L.J., June 29,
1992, at 5 (reporting on Canada's concerns as expressed in its amicus brief to the
Supreme Court).
79. Id.
80. See, eg., Abramovsky, supra note 47, at 201.
81. Pursuant to the terms of the United States-Mexico extradition treaty, if the
Mexican government decides not to extradite a Mexican citizen, it must prosecute the
case in Mexico, provided it has jurisdiction over the offense. U.S.-Mex. Treaty, supra
note 66, at 5065. In practice, however, Mexico only extradites its citizens in unusual
circumstances. Abramovsky, supra note 47, at 206-07 n.271 (citing A.B.A. Sec. Crim.
Jus., Developments in Mexican-US. Law Enforcement Cooperation: What the Practi-
tioner Needs to Know 41 (B. Zagaris ed. 1990)). See also Matorin, supra note 22, at 907
n.2 (citing 132 CONG. REC. 11,462 (1986) (statement of Sen. Hawkins)).
82. Other countries that do not have an extradition treaty with the United States
will be able to justify the application of "extradition" policies to United States citizens
by referring to the Alvarez-Machain decision. See Abramovsky, supra note 47, at 151-
52. Iran, a country with which the United States has had a strained relationship, legal-
ized extraterritorial arrests of Americans in 1989. See Richard A. Serrano, Iranian
Newspaper Wants Capt Rogers Held, Tried, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1989, at B2 (noting
the passage of a law by the Iranian Parliament permitting such arrests).
83. Ruth Wedgwood, A Dangerous Precedent, NAT'L L.J., July 6, 1992, at 15. For
example, India may want to abduct Warren Anderson, the CEO of Union Carbide Cor-
poration, for the 1984 chemical accident that occurred at Union Carbide's plant in Bho-
pal, India, which killed and injured thousands of Indian citizens. Id Prior to Alvarez-
Machain, United States citizens were reasonably certain that no other country could
take them from the United States unless that country submitted an extradition request
and a United States judge believed that the charges set out in the request met American
standards for criminal liability. Id
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States.8 4 They maintain that the United States must be able to obtain
custody over nonresidents who export drugs into the country. 5 The
process that allows other countries to choose to prosecute their own
nationals is not always effective.86 For example, the law of prosecution
in Mexico, coupled with the slowness of the Mexican process, can
prove very disappointing to United States officials.8 7
With regard to the drug wars, this decision will impact the trial of
General Manuel Noriega. In 1989, United States troops invaded Pan-
ama and captured Noriega. 8 The United States did not use formal
extradition proceedings.8 9 One of the purposes for the invasion was to
have Noriega stand trial in the United States for drug trafficking.9'
Alvarez-Machain eliminates many arguments that Noriega might make
regarding the court's jurisdiction over him as a result of the extradition
treaty between the United States and Panama.91
In addition to the exigencies of the drug wars, the federal courts may
not be the proper place to determine foreign policy issues. One com-
mentator notes that extradition is a foreign policy issue that should be
dealt with by the political branches of the United States government,
not by the courts.92 The President presides over foreign policy because
the nation's foreign policy is most effective when stated through one
voice.93 When a court decision goes beyond the boundaries of a treaty,
a court comes periously close to setting foreign policy. 94 Per one com-
84. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 4, at 392 (finding that "[t]he problem of drug
trafficking and drug use is apparent to people of the United States").
85. Id at 392-98.
86. See, eg., Abramovsky, supra note 47, at 206-07 n.271 (citing A.B.A. See. Crim.
Jus., Developments in Mexican-U.S. Law Enforcement Cooperation: What the Practi-
tioner Needs to Know 47 (B. Zagaris ed. 1990)).
87. See id.
88. On December 20, 1989, approximately 24,000 troops invaded and took control
of the Republic of Panama and installed the elected government of President Guillermo
Endara. Andrew Rosenthal, US. Troops Gain Wide Control in Panama; New Leaders
Put in but Noriega Gets Away, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1989, at Al, A8.
89. Campbell, supra note 4, at 391.
90. See id. at 390-91.
91. See Treaty on Extradition, May 25, 1904, U.S.-Pan., arts. III-V, 34 Stat. 2851,
2853-55 (outlining the manner for requisitioning fugitives and stating that neither of the
contracting parties is required to deliver up its own citizens).
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mentator, this is why the court properly dismissed international law
considerations in construing the treaty. 95
Yet, for the very reason that the President is the acting voice of the
United States in foreign affairs, the Court should consider the fact that
the President spoke for America when he agreed to the United States-
Mexico extradition treaty.96 The Alvarez-Machain decision eviscerates
the treaty.9v The language of the treaty belies the Court's holding that
the governments did not intend for the treaty to apply to the entire
subject of extradition between the two countries.9 Logic dictates that
neither country would agree to the treaty if it did not believe that the
other government would have to abide by the treaty guidelines.9 9
Finally, some assert that the Court should use its supervisory power
in situations such as the abduction of a foreign national."° A federal
court has the discretion to use its supervisory power to slow police
conduct that may not be unconstitutional but is improper.10 1 The
95. See id. (stating that the international law cited in the Alvarez-Machain opinion
is no more than a group of policy preferences which the federal courts must subrogate
to the mandates of the elected branches).
96. President Jimmy Carter ratified the extradition treaty with Mexico on Decem-
ber 13, 1979. U.S.-Mex. Treaty, supra note 66, at 5059.
97. See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2198-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The preamble of the treaty states that its overall
purpose is to promote cooperation among the two countries in their fight against crime.
See U.S.-Mex. Treaty, supra note 66, at 5061. The Treaty then describes the parties'
obligations regarding the listed extraditable offenses committed inside and outside the
territory of the requesting party. Id at 5061-63. It lists special rules for political of-
fenses, capital punishment, and extradition of nationals. Id. at 5063-65. And the treaty
provides procedural and evidentiary requirements for extradition. Id. at 5066-70. All
of this combines to cover the full scope of situations encountered in extraditions. See
112 S. Ct. at 2199 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. See 112 S. Ct. at 2199 (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Verdugo-Ur-
quidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1349-51 (9th Cir. 1991) (asserting that the treaty provisions are
meaningless if a signatory government does not always have to comply with their
terms), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992). Article 9 of the Treaty specifically states that
each country's executive has the discretion to determine whether to extradite its own
citizens. U.S.-Mex. Treaty, supra note 66, at 5065. If the United States government, a
party to the treaty, is free to kidnap those individuals it desires, the Article 9 discretion
disappears. See 112 S. Ct. at 2200 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1351 (9th Cir. 1991)).
100. Gentin, supra note 32, at 1246-47.
101. See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983). The Court has a
threefold purpose underlying the use of its supervisory powers: "to implement a rem-
edy for violation of recognized rights; to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a
conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly before the jury; and finally, as a
remedy designed to deter illegal conduct." Id at 505 (citations omitted).
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Court's supervisory power keeps the court from becoming a "partner
in crime" with the government."0 2 In the last few decades, however,
Supreme Court decisions have curtailed the use of the supervisory
powers doctrine, 10 3 although a few lower federal courts have indicated
a willingness to revive it and use their supervisory power in extradition
kidnapping cases."
IV. CONCLUSION
As a result of the Alvarez-Machain decision, the United States can
"properly" ignore extradition treaties with other countries if it so
chooses. Apparently, the only circumstances in which the treaty ap-
plies are when the government chooses to invoke its procedures. This
approach is based on a "since it didn't say we can't, we can" mentality.
Even though the United States may have a treaty with another coun-
try, abducted defendants can only object to their seizure as against the
terms of a relevant extradition treaty if the United States government
initially chooses to invoke the extradition treaty procedures.10 5 Unless
a country that is a party to a treaty with the United States has a better
means of finding or obtaining certain exiles, there are no short term
reasons why the United States would not simply enter the exile country
and bring the target individual back to the States.
Despite the government's policy that favors apprehending individu-
als who commit crimes against the United States, it must maintain the
integrity of the treaties it enters."°c The United States should not for-
102. Gentin, supra note 32, at 1247.
103. Initially, in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1943), the Court
reserved the power to transcend constitutional limits when contrary holdings would
jeopardize judicial integrity. Subsequently, however, the Court has espoused a re-
trenchment of sorts. See, eg., Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255
(1988) (citing United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 71-72 (1986), and United States
v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 (1983)) (requiring egregious governmental conduct that
substantially prejudices a defendant before a federal court can invoke its supervisory
power). See Gentin, supra note 32, at 1248-52 for a detailed discussion of the current
state of the supervisory power doctrine.
104. See, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1535-41 (S.D. Fla.
1990) (suggesting that the court is willing to use its supervisory power if governmental
impropriety is equated to shocking or pervasive misconduct). See also Gentin, supra
note 32, at 1251-52.
105. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2196-97.
106. See id. at 2208 n.37 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Society is the ultimate loser
when, in order to convict the guilty, it uses methods that lead to decreased respect for
the law.") (citing United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 274 (2d Cir. 1974)).
1993]
Washington University Open Scholarship
280 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 44:265
get the purpose of an extradition treaty: to promote cooperation
among countries in the fight against crime."°7 Where the government
agrees to allow another country to decline extraditing its own nation-
als, it should honor that agreement. If it does not now respect the
letter of the agreement and the country it is dealing with, the United
States can expect no more when the tables are turned.
Stephanie A. Rd*
107. The preamble to the 1978 United States-Mexico extradition treaty states the
two governments' desire "to cooperate more closely in the fight against crime and, to
this end, to mutually render better assistance in matters of extraditions." U.S.-Mex.
Treaty, supra note 66, at 5061.
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